Wie sind Konzepte zur erfolgsabhängigen Entlohnung des Managements konsistent in die Unternehmensbewertung zu integrieren? Was sind die Konsequenzen für die Aufteilung des Risikos und des Unternehmenswertes zwischen Eigentümern und Management? Mit diesen Fragen befasst sich der Beitrag „Executive Compensation and Company Valuation“ von Prof. Dr. Andreas Schüler, der zur Veröffentlichung in der renommierten Zeitschrift Abacus angenommen worden ist.

Executive Compensation and Company Valuation:

In the literature, the integration of the cash and risk effects of executive compensation into company valuation is discussed only marginally. This paper addresses the question of how these effects can be integrated into corporate valuation. Several methods for solving the problem are discussed and a method free of circular references is identified. It is similar to the adjusted present value (APV) approach to company valuation. Contrary to a common assumption in the literature, there is no uniform and constant cost of capital for a company that uses employee stock options. Cost of capital need to be adjusted to the cash and risk impact of equity-based executive compensation. Making recourse to the treasury stock method, which is used to calculate diluted earnings per share, is not recommended here even though a corrected version of this method is used. We discuss different forms of equity-based executive compensation including the resulting allocation of risk and net present value between owners and managers.

Die Untersuchung wurde an der Professur für Finanzdienstleistung und Finanzwirtschaft durchgeführt.