Due to the concentrated ownership in companies run by founders or their families (hereafter: family businesses), we can observe special forms of social influence and use of power within and between the institutions of corporate management in these companies. Against this background, we are interested in investigating the following research questions:

  1. What are the patterns of top executives' professional networking (e.g., appointments in supervisory boards) in family businesses? To what extent does an increasing number of board appointments in other family businesses reinforce the "family logic" within family businesses?
  2. To what extent and under which conditions are new members of family businesses admitted into the management elite of the company?
  3. What is the influence of a CEO's professional network (e.g., board appointments) on the probability of being (not) dismissed?

In answering these questions, we are interested in exploring the differences between family businesses and non-family businesses, but also in gaining greater insights into the heterogeneity of family businesses.