abstract-nomos99.htm — HTML, 3 kB (3.110 bytes)





<FONT SIZE=5><B><P ALIGN="CENTER">On a Common Principle for Force Planning in NATO's New Mission Environment: Accounting for the Interdependence of Force Size, Personnel Structure and Modernization Trends under Limited Budgets</B></FONT>
Reiner K. Huber and Bernhard P. Schmidt<BR>
Reproduced with permission from <I>Defense Analysis for the 21st Century: Issues, Approaches, Models</I> 
(Reiner K. Huber/Hans W. Hofmann (Eds.))<BR>
published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 1999, pp.139-156<BR>
<FONT SIZE=5><B>Abstract</B><BR>

Based on a comparative analysis of defense budgets and personnel structures, the authors categorize the military forces of NATO nations in terms of their relative modernization level and out-of-area (OOA) capabilities for operations in NATO's new mission environment. In order to improve NATO's military capability in support of international crisis management, they suggest that NATO-Europe might share a common principle for the evolution of their military forces:
<I>Stepwise reduction of manpower and conscript levels in a manner that the highest possible level of modernization can be attained without having to increase the defense budget in real terms and subject to the constraints that 1) the existing manpower capability for OOA-deployments is not decreased; 2) a sufficient build-up capability is preserved as long as the resurgence of a massive ground force threat against NATO-territory may not be dismissed altogether.</I>
Based on this principle there are several options that countries may consider for the long-term evolution of their military forces. For example, Germany may choose a two- or three step strategy. In the first step, the manpower levels of the German Army might be reduced by 20 percent, and its conscription level from 48 to 42 percent, thus returning to an investment level of close to 30 percent in the defense budget within a decade which would be sufficient to at least arrive at the medium modernization level C. In the second step � which may be passed over if conditions permit � the conscription level would be reduced further by lowering the terms of conscription down to the minimum time required for maintaining a recruitment and mobilization manpower base. In the third step, to be taken as soon as the second constraint can be dropped and conscripts would no longer be the principal source of recruiting volunteers, conscription would be suspended altogether in favor of an all-volunteer force of about 200-250.000 troops thus freeing the funds for eventually arriving at a uniform modernization level corresponding to that of French forces. The modernization level of US- or UK-forces may be reached only if, contrary to the proposed principle, the defense budget were increased, or the requirement for maintaining the current OOA manpower capability relaxed.


Dokument: <A HREF="nomos99.pdf">nomos99</A> (PDF-Datei, 18 Seiten, 220 KB)