



UNSW
SYDNEY


Australia's
Global
University

seL4: Verified Operating System for the Real World

Gernot Heiser

gernot@unsw.edu.au

@GernotHeiser



seL4 Born August 2009



Stories Recent Popular

Betriebssystem mit Korrektheitsbeweis

Forscher am Australia's ICT Research Centre of Excellence (NICTA) haben einen Betriebssystem-Microkernel entwickelt, dessen Korrektheit sie formal beweisen konnten. Der Kernel namens Secure Embedded L4 – kurz seL4 – besteht aus 8700 Zeilen C-Code und soll sich für reale (Embedded-)Anwendungen wie Fahr- oder Flugzeugsteuerungen eignen. Der Beweis umfasst jedoch nur 7500 Zeilen, der Rest ist Boot-Code, der nur einmal ausgeführt wird. Laut dem zwölfköpfigen Forscherteam rund um

Dr. Klein wurde vergleichbare wiesen. Es hat um einen der ersten Beweise behauptet. Einzeltheoreme mehr als 200. Die eigentliche Beweisführung übernahm ein Programm in München und Cambridge. Der formale Beweis zeigt, dass der C-Code exakt der Spezifikation entspricht.



A NICTA bejelentette a világ első, formális módszerekkel igazolt,

New Scientist

Saturday 29/8/2009

Page: 21

Section: General News

Region: National

Type: Magazines Science / Technology

Size: 196.31 sq.cms.

Published: -----S-

ogy a világon elsőként b
es ellenőrzését.

álási körülmények közé :
goldásokba -, ahol a bei

The ultimate way to keep your computer safe from harm

FLAWS in the code, or "kernel", that sits at the heart of modern computers leave them prone to occasional malfunction and vulnerable to attack by worms and viruses. So the development of a secure general-purpose microkernel could pave the

just mathematics, and you can reason about them mathematically," says Klein.

His team formulated a model with more than 200,000 logical steps which allowed them to prove that the program would always behave as its

aborjának számítási logi
közterek nélkül komme
ni egyedülálló teljesítmé
megbizhatóságot kapnak a szoftvertől, amely e

Does it run Linux? "We're pleased to say that it does."

DISCUSSION

code

seL4 What is seL4?


seL4 is an open source, high-assurance, high-performance operating system microkernel

Available on GitHub
under GPLv2 license

World's most comprehensive
mathematical proofs of
correctness and security



World's fastest
microkernel

Piece of software that
runs at the heart of any
system and controls all
accesses to resources



seL4 What is seL4?

➔ **seL4 is the most trustworthy foundation for safety- and security-critical systems**



➔ **Already in use across many domains:
automotive, aviation, space, defence, critical infrastructure,
cyber-physical systems, IoT, industry 4.0, certified security...**



The Performance Benchmark

Latency (in cycles) of a round-trip cross-address-space IPC on x64

World's fastest
microkernel!


Source	seL4	Fisco.OC	Zircon
Mi et al, 2019	986	2717	8157
Gu et al, 2020	1450	3057	8151
seL4.systems, Nov'20	797	N/A	N/A

Temporary performance
regression in Dec'19

Sources:

- Zeyu Mi, Dingji Li, Zihan Yang, Xinran Wang, Haibo Chen: "SkyBridge: Fast and Secure Inter-Process Communication for Microkernels", EuroSys, April 2020
- Jinyu Gu, Xinyue Wu, Wentai Li, Nian Liu, Zeyu Mi, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen: "Harmonizing Performance and Isolation in Microkernels with Efficient Intra-kernel Isolation and Communication", Usenix ATC, June 2020
- seL4 Performance, <https://sel4.systems/About/Performance/>, accessed 2020-11-08

seL4 Proofs



seL4 Functional Correctness Summary

Kinds of properties proved

- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by abstract model
- Behaviour of C code is fully captured by executable model
- Kernel never fails, behaviour is always well-defined
 - assertions never fail
 - will never de-reference null pointer
 - will never access array out of bounds
 - cannot be subverted by malformed input
- All syscalls terminate, reclaiming memory is safe, ...
- Well typed references, aligned objects, kernel always mapped...
- Access control is decidable


Can prove further properties on abstract level!

Bugs found:

- 16 in (shallow) testing
- 460 in verification
 - 160 in C,
 - 150 in design,
 - 150 in spec


seL4 Verification Assumptions

1. Hardware behaves as expected
 - Formalised hardware-software contract (ISA)
 - Hardware implementation free of bugs, Trojans, ...
2. Spec matches expectations
 - Can only prove “security” if specify what “security” means
 - Spec may not be what we think it is
3. Proof checker is correct
 - Isabel/HOL checking core that validates proofs against logic



With binary verification do
not need to trust C compiler!

seL4 Verification Cost in Context



Real-World Use

seL4 DARPA HACMS



Unmanned Little Bird (ULB)

Retrofit
existing
system!




Autonomous trucks



Develop
technology




Off-the-shelf
Drone airframe




GVR-Bot


seL4 ULB Architecture




seL4 Incremental Cyber Retrofit



seL4 Incremental Cyber Retrofit




seL4 Incremental Cyber Retrofit




seL4 Issue: seL4 Objects are Low-Level

A


B




seL4 Simple But Non-Trivial System




seL4 Component Middleware: CAmkES



seL4 HACMS UAV Architecture



seL4 Enforcing the Architecture



seL4 Military-Grade Security

Cross-Domain Desktop Compositor



Multi-level secure terminal

- Successful trials in AU, US, UK, CA
- Commercialisation in progress

Secure communication device in use in AU, UK defence forces





Real-World Use

Courtesy Boeing, DARPA

